Facts Cannot Explain Facts

Chapter 1, Section 2: Facts Cannot Explain Facts

In science, phenomenon, fact, behavior and observation are equivalent concepts, though there exist phenomena not observable by unaided eyes.

To explain a phenomenon, an abstract theory instead of fact is needed. Why does abstraction get involved in such a task? The answer is: the laws behind facts cannot be obvious, and regularities only is not sufficient for explanation. When rain falls, there must be clouds in the sky, which is the regularity for such a phenomenon, but rain cannot explain those clouds. Wheat grow in soil, a regularity, but soil cannot explain wheat. Clear definition of asset rights brings prosperity to economy, another regularity, but the prosperity cannot explain why the definition of asset rights need exist. So from regularities we can only know things are so, but not why they are so.

If phenomenon B happens when A happens, based on this should we deem A explains B, or B explains A, then here comes two obstacles. First, there are too many regularities in this world. Should these countless phenomena and regularities can be self-explained, then in each field the theories would be so rich that none of them has general use in explanation. If one phenomenon can explain another, once we have their regularity at hand it's explained, then what's the good of human reasoning? Second, the regularity of a phenomenon may change with different conditions. For instance, feather generally falls, but it can go up in wind. But if wind can explain the rise, why can't rock rise in wind either? In what way shall we classify all the phenomena? A scientific principle or theory. One function of science is to define classifications so that phenomena can be systematically arranged.

K. Brunner once said: fact cannot be explained by just another fact. M. Friedman said: the regularity of a fact requires explanation. In the economics circle, the best saying is from A. Marshall: "these conflicting experiences tell us that, unless through rational investigation and explanation, we can learn nothing from facts. They also make us know that, the most reckless and hypocritical, are those theorists who claim facts are self-explainable, or manipulate, unintentionally, the choice and combination of facts and derive the conclusion: post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this)."